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ABSTRACT
This paper expands on the relationship between disease burdens and the onset of violent conflict
in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1990-2012. Most studies have focused on conflict as a cause of HIV
transmission, while some suggest that HIV infection rates, by substantially reducing lifeexpectancy, increase the onset of violence by lowering the opportunity cost of rebelling for HIVpositive individuals. This paper argues that to the degree that life expectancy is important to
opportunity costs, it is more likely driven by other factors. First, I argue preventable diseases that
are less connected to individual decision-making, and the presence of poor health infrastructure
more generally, are more likely to both introduce grievances and lower the opportunity costs of
rebellion. Second, I argue the HIV-onset link requires the questionable assumptions that HIV
positive individuals know their status in sufficient numbers, are fit to fight after learning of their
status, and “have nothing to live for.” By introducing more direct and disaggregated measures
from the Global Burden of Disease project, including years of life lost and disability-adjusted life
years, I find that non-HIV health challenges are strongly associated with onset of violent conflict.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Countries in sub-Saharan African (SSA) have made moderate progress in public health over the
past several decades. Since the 1970s, there have been improvements in the reduction of
premature mortality for various diseases and conditions, in addition to increases in life
expectancy. On average, SSA countries gained eleven years of life over the past 50 years (IHME
2013). According to the World Health Organization (WHO), SSA has reduced premature death
and disability from various diseases and adverse health conditions. In particular, there have been
notable drops in DALYs1 for measles, tetanus, malaria, and HIV (IHME 2013). For example,
between 1990 and 2012, the region experienced an 86% decline of health loss due to measles
along with a 63% reduction in tetanus DALYs. The DALY burden from HIV reduced from
15.2% in 2005 to 8.1% in 2010 (GBD 2017). Despite regional reductions in burdens of certain
conditions over time, SSA had noticeable increases in other areas of health that have reduced on
a global scale. Over twenty years (1990-2010), SSA experienced spikes in maternal disorders
(32%) and preterm birth complications (19%) (IHME 2013). Further, the region continues to
surpass the rest of the world in premature death and mortality from neonatal complications,
lower respiratory infections, diarrheal illnesses, and HIV (GBD 2017). Despite the surge in
adverse birth-related conditions and the lack of progress in curbing the burden of relatively
preventable conditions, the SSA public health concern that has garnered the most attention in
political science research is HIV.
This is not without reason. The 1990s witnessed a multitude of civil wars, interstate wars,
and insurgency warfare across the continent. Violent conflicts included the Taureg Rebellions

DALYs are calculated as the sum of the Years of Life Lost (YLL) due to premature mortality in the population and
the Years Lost due to Disability (YLD) for people living with a specific health condition. One DALY is considered
a one-year loss of healthy life.
1
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(1990-95), the Rwandan Civil War (1990-1994), the Sierra Leone Civil War (1991-2002), the
Burundi Civil War (1993-95), the First (1996-97) and Second Congo (1998-2003) Wars, the
South African intervention in Lesotho (1998-99), the Guinea Bissau Civil War (1998-99), and
various insurgencies from the Allied Democratic Forces in Uganda. This list is not exhaustive.
Throughout the 1990s, state-based battle-related deaths surged, and over the decade, millions of
men, women, and children lost their lives amid the state-sanctioned, one-sided, and non-state
violence (PRIO 2018).
The 1990s is also the decade when substantial information about HIV’s impact became
more evident to the scientific community. Data collected over time made is it evident that HIV
has disproportionate and adverse effects within SSA relative to other regions. Eastern and
Southern Africa are the most HIV afflicted regions in the world and are home to the largest
populations of people living with HIV. In 2017, 68% of the world’s HIV-positive populations
lived in SSA. According to the Global Burden of Disease (GDB 2017), in 1998, HIV accounted
for 10.9% of DALYs in SSA while the global average was 2.8%. In 2005, HIV accounted for
15.21% of DALYs in SSA, while the global average was 4.28%. Among the eight countries with
the highest HIV prevalence rates, seven are in SSA: Namibia, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, South
Africa, Botswana, Zambia, and Lesotho. Although the overall impact of HIV in SSA is
significant, the burden of overwhelmingly affects individuals along gender lines. For example,
four out of five new infections among adolescents (ages 15-19) are among girls and young
women (ages 10-24) are twice as likely as their male peers to contract HIV at some point in their
lifetime. Young women in Eastern and Southern Africa are likely to acquire HIV five to seven
years earlier than their male peers, and for every three new infections among young men, there
are seven new infections among women of the same age. Given the overlap in violent conflicts
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of the 1990s and the uncovering of the regional impact of HIV in SSA, it is not surprising that
the topic of HIV and implications for conflict, ranging from social unrest to civil war, have
periodically surfaced in social science conversations. There exist two primary arguments.
The first perspective argues that although HIV can significantly reduce life expectancy, it
is likely to have a limited social and political effect and is unlikely to lead to an outburst of
violence or conflict (Caldwell 1997; De Waal 2006). The organization and coordination between
local African civil society organizations, African governments, and various international and
non-governmental institutions have been notably effective at managing HIV as so much to
minimize political threats and outbreaks of violence (De Waal 2007, pg. 3). Despite escalating
deaths and dire prospects from HIV in the 1990s, Caldwell2 noted that up until 2006, there were
no recorded cases of the African electorate using violence to demand or coerce government
institutions into making HIV a top priority. Nor has there been any societal collapse or
revolutionary transformations (De Waal 2007, pg. 2). Caldwell succinctly stated:
“The additional death rate because of the epidemic, up to ten
thousand annually in some countries, is of a similar magnitude to
the experience of France during the First World War… Yet…
Governments are not threatened by accusations of mishandling the
epidemic. Not a single protest demonstration has occurred. Life
goes on in a surprisingly normal way” (Caldwell 1997, pg. 180).

John C. Caldwell (1928-2016) was a leading health care demographer in the areas of fertility and health transition.
He researched in Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia and is most known for his “wealth flows” theory that
relates demographic transition to changes in intergenerational transfers within families..
2
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The second perspective argues that HIV-related conditions have the ability to cause social
conflicts that undermine political stability (Fourie & Schönteich 2001; Garret 2005; Kustra
2017). The Central Intelligence Agency also tracked HIV’s impact on security in SSA
throughout the 1990s and suggested that HIV is “one of the variables that determine which states
self-destruct” (Fourie & Schönteich 2001, pg. 30). In 2000, Kofi Annan, the UN SecretaryGeneral and James Wolfensohn, the president of the World Bank, related the impact of HIV to
the destruction of warfare in its ability to threaten political stability (Fourie & Schönteich 2001,
pg. 30).
There are three dominant theories regarding HIV’s negative impact on national security.
The first argument cites the disease’s ability to erode at economic security (Fourie & Schönteich
2001; Garrett 2005; Haacker 2002; Boutayeb 2009). In SSA, deaths from HIV impact adults in
the most productive part of their lives, between the age of 25 and 40. Consequently, deaths from
this age cohort affect both personal and family incomes, investment, and company profits
(Garrett 2005; Haacker 2002; Boutayeb 2009). It is difficult to gauge the impact of HIV on the
continent’s economies on an aggregate level. However, there have not been any recorded cases
of economic collapse directly attributable to HIV conditions. The second theory asserts that HIV
could impact political security by claiming the lives of national leaders, government officials,
and military leadership (Garrett 2005, pg. 59). Depriving states and localities of seasoned
institutional management could aid in creating a political vacuum that supports the conditions for
violence. Much like the first argument, there have been no recorded cases of HIV killing off
government officials so quickly as to create a political vacuum leading to conflict.
The third theory asserts that HIV infection rates, by substantially reducing life-expectancy,
increase the onset of conflict by lowering the opportunity cost of rebelling for HIV-positive

4

individuals because they “have nothing to live for” (Kustra 2017, pg. 3). The opportunity cost of
conflict is the value of the decision foregone in order to participate in a movement. Death is an
opportunity cost that varies with life expectancy, and a positive HIV diagnosis is considered an
automatic death sentence. Shortened life expectancies make young, seropositive people more
accepting of other risks, particularly armed conflict, helping to satisfy conditions for conflict. As
will be explored, the argument is theoretically problematic because it makes questionable
presumptions about how individuals react to a positive diagnosis and assumes that HIV-positive
individuals know their status in sufficient numbers and are fit to fight after learning of their
status.
The two broad, contrasting perspectives on the effect of HIV on violence leads to a
crossroads in the discussion. Does HIV influence the likelihood of conflict in some capacity? It
is unclear, as empirical investigations of the issue are sparse (see Kustra 2017). The theory that
life expectancy impacts the opportunity cost of conflict warrants further attention because of its
ability to incite conflict through a different process. Moving the conversation beyond HIV, is it
possible that reduced life expectancy from non-HIV diseases affects the likelihood of violence? I
posit that sustained non-HIV disease burdens are more likely to lower the opportunity costs of
participating in acts of violence, thus increasing the likelihood of conflict. Using updated health
indicator data from the Global Burden of Disease (GBD), I use two probit regressions along with
and predictive margin plots to test my theory of disease conditions and violent conflict.
This paper begins with a systematic review of HIV and conflict literature, addressing the
main points main in each HIV-conflict perspective. I begin with the relationship between
soldiers, military organizations, and HIV. Following is a review of disease and risk-taking, the
motivations for rebellion, and the opportunity costs associated with such a movement. In the
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second section, I revisit the HIV-conflict model and offer empirical and theoretical arguments
against the theory. In the third section, I posit that sustained burdens from illnesses unrelated to
HIV may have a positive effect on the likelihood of violent conflict. In the fourth section, I test
the disease-onset propositions using new health care metrics from the GBD through a series of
probit regressions and predictive margin analyses. I have two main findings. The first is that HIV
is unassociated with the onset of violent conflict. The second is that non-HIV related conditions
are significantly associated with the onset of violent conflict. In the final section, I discuss this
study’s implications policy regarding public health and security in SSA and I address a couple
avenues for future research.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
To the degree that disease can impact prospects for violence, I argue that conditions less related
to HIV and more related to preventable illnesses are more likely to be drivers of conflict. In order
to build support for my argument against the HIV-conflict model, I address the literature on
HIV’s potential impact on national security. Specifically, I include literature on HIV conditions
among soldiers and recruits, the impact of the disease on military organization, and the role of
HIV transmission during acts of sexual violence perpetrated during conflict. Then, to build
support for my theory of disease and conflict, I incorporate literature on disease and risk-taking,
rebel recruitment, and the opportunity costs of decision-making.

Soldiers, Military Organization, and HIV
The nexus between the role of soldiers and the transmission of HIV during wartime is
convoluted. Earlier literature overwhelmingly supported the idea that soldiers are frequent
transmitters of the disease. However, the current impact of the disease on soldiers and the
mechanisms making them more or less susceptible to infection varies in emphasis and remains
unclear (Shell 1999; Elbe 2002; Hankins et al 2002; Ostergard 2002; Singer 2002; Tripodi &
Patel 2002, 2004; Miles 2003; Garrett 2005; Sagala 2006, 2008; Iqbal & Zorn 2010; Whiteside et
al 2006; McInnes & Rushton 2010). The narrative that initially garnered the most attention was
that armed forces, insurgents, and soldiers are high-risk occupations for acquiring and
transmitting HIV. It was commonly thought that such occupations tend to have higher prevalence
rates relative to the general population (Singer 2002; Ba et al. 2008; Iqbal & Zorn 2010). There
were several reasons for this rational.
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A common association between high infection rates and soldiers are the commonplace
sexual relationships with prostitutes and the commercial sex activity widely available in the
proximity surrounding military camps (Sagala 2006). Military bases are ground zero for
attracting other high-risk populations, including prostitutes and drug dealers, demographics more
likely to be infected with HIV (Singer 2002). Proximity to sex workers, combined with riskacceptant behaviors, such as lack of condom use, significantly increases infection rates among
military members (Hankins et al 2005; Iqbal & Zorn 2010). Not only do soldiers tend to be of a
sexually active age group, but they also have a greater opportunity for sexual relations, tend to be
more risk-acceptant, and are often thought to “valorize violent behavior” (Elbe 2002; Singer
2002).
Further, increased mobility, occupational stresses, peer pressure, isolation from regular
sexual partners and families, and a sense of personal invulnerability have been linked to the high
levels of infection among soldiers (Tripoli & Patel 2002, 2004; Sagala 2006). The spread of HIV
is not only linked to national armed forces, but international peacekeeping troops are
acknowledged as prominent vectors for transmission amidst conflict (Ostergard 2002; Garrett
2005). The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNAIDS have recognized the health
threats posed by peacekeeping operations concerning HIV (Tripodi & Patel 2004). Not only are
peacekeepers susceptible to infection through complex emergencies and operations, but they also
have higher risks of acquiring it through the sexual assault of HIV-positive individuals and
consensual sex with prostitutes (Sagala 2008).
Another argument to the soldier-HIV relationship is presented by Whiteside et al (2006)
who argue that HIV prevalence rates are low among new military recruits. Prospective recruits
testing positive for HIV are routinely excluded from service (Whiteside et al 2006). Via informal
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consultations and mass medical screenings, HIV-positive individuals are systematically weeded
out and are declined enlistment into military roles. African military organizations and the United
Nations began incorporating HIV education in peacekeeping and military training and mandatory
pre-deployment medical screenings (Thomas et al 2014). A 2014 cross-sectional survey from 28
SSA countries regarding military-HIV policy found that HIV surveillance initiatives and
structural prevention programs are routinely conducted (Thomas et al 2014). The majority of
militaries surveyed (92.9%) reported having an official HIV program manager or designated
disease oversight procedures of some capacity. Among respondents, 88% require mandatory
recruit screenings of incoming personnel, and 71% conduct random, mandatory HIV testing on
active personnel. The general consensus is that enlistment becomes restricted when an individual
is found to be HIV positive during the recruiting process. Over 96% of the militaries surveyed do
not recruit or enlist HIV positive individuals. However, there are no official reports regarding the
forced or mandatory discharge of staff members found to be HIV positive after enrollment
(Thomas et al 2014). Changes in recruitment patterns and increased screening methods are
relatively recent. Therefore, issues relating to HIV incidences among soldiers was likely more a
salient issue in the 1980s and 90s, as little was known about the disease at the time. However,
this argument of low prevalence levels among new recruit does not address that idea that the
recruits can be HIV-free upon registration but then become infected while on duty and become
“super spreaders” while in service.
HIV can have a destabilizing effect on strategic military capacity. Organizational norms,
recruiting, and training of general and specialized soldiers can be severely impacted by the loss
of personnel who died of HIV complications (Ba et al 2008). It may also weaken national
security directly through HIV transmission and indirectly through governments reallocating
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funds away from military services into health care costs (Tripodi & Patel 2004). The virus can
challenge military capabilities by increasing the probability of opportunistic, and potentially
deadly, infections of soldiers who are HIV-positive (Ostergard 2002) and requiring militaries to
continually acquire recruits to replace ill-fallen or dead soldiers (Elbe 2002).
Infantry troops are generally easier to replace, but HIV directly impacts leadership
positions as it becomes more challenging to replace individuals of high ranks such as
commanders or a top technical officers, creating gaps in leadership cadres (Singer 2002; Garrett
2005). Weakened military organization can have an impact of the calculus of rebels. If the HIVconflict model proposed by Kustra were correct, the findings could be explained by healthy
rebels deciding to fight against HIV-weakened state militaries. In the midst of a health crisis,
rebels are more likely to calculate a higher chance of winning against state militaries. Fearon and
Laitin (2003) posit that a financially and bureaucratically weak state is a significant risk factor
for the initiation of violence. Weakened leadership networks and increased health related costs
for the military weaken the state from a financial and bureaucratic perspective, which may help
to further satisfy conditions for rebellion.

Sexual Violence and HIV
The systematic use of sexual violence is not a new mechanism of warfare (Elbe 2002). However,
it is becoming increasingly organized for strategic and political purposes during violent conflict
and has been formally recognized by the United Nations as a weapon of war (Singer 2002;
Virginie et al 2010). The definition of sexual violence is broad and includes, but is not limited to
mass rape, gang rape, sexual slavery, and forced marriages of women, children, and men. Initial
reports published in the social sciences suggest there is a link between sexual violence in conflict
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afflicted countries (CACs) and the proliferation of HIV. However, emerging epidemiological
evidence is beginning to shift the understanding of the implications of rape on HIV infection and
transmission during conflict.
The prevailing argument is that during bouts of conflict, the breakdown of social control
encourages the use of sexual force as tactic of warfare and increases the potential of military to
civilian HIV transmission (Iqbal & Zorn 2010). The 20th Activity Report of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights made a landmark decision to consider the use of an
infectious disease as a punishable weapon of warfare after publishing a report estimating that as
many as 2,000 HIV-infected foreign soldiers committed sexual violence with the intent to
transmit HIV to the victims in the South Kivu province in the DRC during the 1999 civil war
(Singer 2002; Mills & Nachega 2006).
Similarly, a 2002 study on HIV in the military published an account of Rwandan soldiers
taunting their victims after sexually assaulting them by stating, “We are not killing you. We are
giving you something worse. You will die a slow death” (Singer 2002). Sexual violence and
systemic rape have been perpetrated by the United Revolutionary Front against thousands of
women during the Sierra Leone Civil War, yet, it remains unclear how many of these victims
contracted HIV from the attacks (Singer 2002). Virgine et al (2010) use a risk equation model to
evaluate the potential impact of mass rape on incidences of HIV among women and girls in
Burundi, DRC, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, southern Sudan, Somalia, and Uganda. Data from the
UNAIDS, WHO, and the US Census Bureau’s International Data Base suggest that mass rape
could cause five HIV infections per 100,000 females annually in the DRC, Sudan, Somalia and
Sierra Leone, ten HIV infections in Burundi and Rwanda, and twenty HIV infections in Uganda.
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Even in extreme conditions where mass rape is rampant, the impact of rape on increasing HIV
prevalence is negligible.
Spiegel et al (2007) report an alternative perspective. The authors assert the widespread
misconception about the role of rape on HIV during conflict is primarily based on an
unpublished and unsubstantiated report based on 1,125 female rape survivors, of which 70%
were estimated to have acquired the disease (Spiegel et al 2007). Using data from the Uppsala
database assessing armed conflict and global literature containing original data for HIV
prevalence rates, the authors conducted a systematic analysis on the change in HIV prevalence
during conflict in seven African countries: DRC, Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia,
and Sierra Leone. Data from these countries did not show an increase in HIV infection rates
during periods of conflict and there is insufficient evidence to support the common claim that
rape significantly increases HIV. Further, HIV prevalence in urban areas affected by conflict
decreased at similar rate as areas unaffected by conflict in Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda.
A more recent study by Anema et al (2008) further asserts that widespread rape in CACs
do not have a significant impact on the population-level change in HIV prevalence. These
findings are based on a model determining the potential effect of conflict-associated rape on HIV
prevalence rates among women, ages 5-49, in seven CACs in SSA: Burundi, DRC, Liberia,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Uganda. Situations in which 15% of the female population
was raped, and HIV prevalence among assailants was eight times the country’s prevalence
among the general population, widespread rape increased total HIV rates of females by 0.023%.
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Disease & Risk-Taking Behavior

A disease-onset model assumes that individuals are more likely to engage in risky
behaviors (i.e., initiate or participate in violent conflict) when faced with a health condition that
substantially reduces life expectancy. Earlier work on risk-taking considers risks from the
perspective of life histories, asserting positive future conditions are positively correlated with
increased risk-averse behaviors (Hill et al 1997). A small-scale questionnaire focusing on
socially disapproved risk behaviors (drug use, unprotected sex, and physical violence) suggests a
negative relationship between life expectancy and risk-taking actions (Hill et al 1997). The
frequency of adverse risk-taking is higher for individuals with increased beliefs of future
unpredictability and among those who perceived themselves to have shorter life spans. In a more
recent study, Wang et al (2010) posit that risk-taking is more effective than risk avoidance when
life expectancies are short or when future unpredictability is high. Subjective life expectancies
impact an individuals’ temporal framework in which they adjust their goals and deadlines in life.
When life expectancies are perceived to be shorter, life deadlines become more imminent, thus
making risks worth taking. Results from the 448 questionnaires regarding perceived riskiness
among individuals ages 18 to 50 suggest that among the three dependent measures (likelihood of
engaging in, perceived riskiness of, and attractiveness of the risky behaviors), perceived riskiness
was affected by only one life-history variable: sex.
When considering how a disease can impact a group’s decision to partake in violent
conflict, it is essential to consider how health conditions and life expectancy affect risk-taking
behavior. Studies on HIV-related risk tend to focus on behaviors as a deliberate choice made by
the individual (Djemai 2010) rather than trying to understand better how behavioral responses
may vary across people. Nevertheless, available literature on behavior variation in risk suggests a
13

positive relationship between increased risk-taking and non-HIV mortality factors (Oster 2009).
Oster (2009) investigates how individual-level responses to risk vary according to changes in life
expectancy from health-related conditions in SSA. Using a model of sexual behavior choice
among HIV-positive and HIV negative individuals, he suggests that risk responses decrease
when expected future survival (increased life expectancy) is longer. The study empirically
supports the argument that individuals with longer life expectancy (those who have more future
life years to lose from HIV) are more likely to alter their behavior and engage in risker sexual
activities than those with a decreased life expectancy from HIV. If individuals with HIV tend to
be less risk-averse than non-HIV positive individuals, aggregated risky behavior should decrease
with higher levels of HIV.

Motivations for Rebellion
Rebel Recruitment
For group-organized violence to occur, there needs to be a groups of incentivized and organized
actors within the respective state who has motivations for achieving independence, taking over
the government, or seeking to alter government policies to some degree. In cases of large scale
conflict, armed rebel groups use organized violence in opposition to the state to achieve a
political end. For a rebel group to be viable, they must have the capacity and capability to engage
in violence against the state. What makes an individual want to join a rebel group in the first
place?
Literature analyzing the incentive systems adopted by various armed rebel groups posits
that rebel groups behave similarly to a mafia or gang (Gates 2002). Contract enforcement is at
the base of recruitment efforts. In order to be successful, a rebel group must be able to recruit and
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motivate its soldiers to fight and have the sufficient capacity and ability to engage in combat
(Gates 2002). Therefore, recruits are obtained and incentivized through various benefits from
higher up the organizational hierarchy of the group. All rebel organizations distribute benefits
that are either pecuniary or non-pecuniary in nature. Pecuniary benefits include tangible awards,
such as monetary funds, drugs, or alcohol. The West Side Boys were a split-off army faction,
turned rebel group in the Sierra Leone Civil War. They offered crack cocaine, heroin, ephedrine
and diazepam, and marijuana as rewards for committing violent crimes (Utas & Jörgel 2008).
On the other hand, nonpecuniary benefits are more extensive in scope and depend on an
agent’s utility and value during assigned tasks. For example, some groups may be incentivized
by “fighting the good fight.” Some are incentivized by sadistic behavior, given license to commit
dangerous and violent acts as rewards for completing tasks. Recruiters can even offer a sense of
security by promising solidarity, making vulnerable possible-recruits feel like they have a group
in which they belong. Weinstein argues that potential recruits choose to partake or abstain from
joining based on economic returns for their labor. Rebel recruiters can offer short-term incentives
or promise future benefits to be provided after specific tasks are complete or the group secures
victory. In order for potential recruits to be motivated to join the organization, the rewards and
incentives must exceed the value of what a recruit would earn if they did not participate in the
movement (Weinstein 2005).
However, it is not always up to the recruit whether they participate — the practice of
coercive poaching and recruiting methods are common. Young recruits and children are
routinely abducted and forced to join rebel organizations out of threat for their lives, as
demonstrated by RENAMO, a Mozambican national resistance organization (Weinstein 2005).
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Studies estimated that around 90% of RENAMO forcefully coerced potential recruits into the
organization (Weinstein 2005).
The practice of recruiting children by guerilla groups, violent non-state actors, and
warlords is a prevalent and consistent human rights violation (Gates 2002; Singer 2002).
Children are perceived as vulnerable and are at a higher risk for exploitation. Children are
abducted and violently forced into armed combat (Foster & Williamson 2000) and recent
assessments estimate that 75-80% of civil wars involve the use of child soldiers by rebel groups
(Faulkner et al 2019). Occasionally, voluntary enlistment is possible if children are faced with
depraved conditions (Singer 2002).
To the degree that HIV does impact recruitment efforts, it is likely to be associated with
the streamline of potential recruits that is created though the increasing “lost orphan generation.”
HIV impacts child soldiering through a process of parental loss. In 2010, over 25 million
children lost either one or both parents from HIV/AIDS-related complications and one-third of
cases occurred in SSA (Leyenaar 2005). The number of victims and the stigma associated with
the disease can increase the burden on family members and communities responsible for caring
after the orphaned children, placing them in a higher risk situation for being exploited by outside
parties.

Opportunity Costs
Although most literature has primarily pointed to HIV as a product of conflict, others have
considered its impact on the decision to rebel (Kustra 2017). An opportunity cost is the value of
what a person decides to give up when making a decision, the price of a missed opportunity.
When weighing a decision with multiple courses of action, the opportunity cost (the price of the
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options not chosen) is taken into consideration. People are more likely to forgo an action when
the opportunity cost is high and engage in certain actions when the opportunity costs are low. In
terms of rebellion, an opportunity costs is the value of what is foregone in order to participate in
the movement. Kustra (2017) builds on the opportunity cost model where the possibility of death
is an opportunity cost that fluctuates with life expectancy. Shorter life expectancies, due to any
one condition, make individuals less concerned about alternative risks (Rosen 1998). Kustra
theorizes that HIV is the ‘condition’ that, by reducing life expectancy, lowers the opportunity
cost for rebellion and incentivizes individuals to participate in violent conflict. The HIV-onset
theory asserts that “Young men who are infected with, or at high risk for infection by, HIV are
more accepting of other risks of death since they believe HIV has or will greatly decrease their
life expectancy” (Kustra 2017, page 3).
If the prospects for living with HIV are bleak, and there is little hope for better outcomes in
the future, infected individuals would be more inclined to participate in violent activities because
they “have nothing to live for” (Kustra 2017, page 3). If the future for living with HIV is grim,
and a positive diagnosis will result in a quick and painful death, individuals are less concerned
about the risks of engaging in armed conflict. Instead of a positive diagnosis inspiring
individuals live out their lives out with their families and loved ones, individuals see their time
better spent participating in a rebellion. Probit analyses using data sourced from Uppsala conflict
database and health care indicators from the World Health Organization supports the theory that
decreases in life expectancy are associated with the increased likelihood of civil war. However,
the relationship between HIV and civil war onset are statistically insignificant.
Beyond life expectancy, the opportunity costs of joining a rebellion are often associated
with econometric measures, most typically levels of income per capita (Elbadawi & Sambanis
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2002; Collier & Hoffer 1998, 2002). Utilizing a probit and tobit regression model and the Singer
and Small dataset of civil war occurrence from 1960-92, Collier & Hoeffler (1998), find
empirical evidence suggesting the proxy variables for economic opportunity costs (per capita
income) is highly significant on the occurrence and duration of civil war. The loss of income per
capita lowers the opportunity cost of rebellion, partly, because people who have more money
simply have more to lose compared to those who have less. Another interpretation is that income
per capita can reflect the cost of recruiting rebel labor (Collier & Hoeffler 2002). Higher per
capita incomes make the cost of recruitment more expensive, making rebellion more difficult and
could be a proxy indicator signifying greater government military capabilities (Collier &
Hoeffler 2002).
Expanding on the model of opportunity costs and rebellion, the ‘greed’ versus ‘grievance’
theory of opportunity costs posited by Collier and Hoeffler (2002) investigates the causal
mechanism for civil war initiation. The ‘greed’ theory focuses on the opportunity costs of
financing operations of rebel groups and the ‘grievance’ theory incorporates opportunity costs of
ethnic fragmentation and political repression. Analyzing civil wars from 1960-99, the authors
find empirical evidence suggesting that income structure is statistically significant to conflict
risk. Higher incomes can strengthen government military expenditures through various taxation
mechanisms, or the effect of higher incomes can increase enrollment of young males in
secondary schools, continuing education for those most vulnerable to joining a rebellion, is
associated with lowering the risk of conflict. It could also be that higher incomes are associated
with generally more positive outlooks regarding the future. If economic prospects are good, the
motivation for rebellion decreases.
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Before discussing my theory of disease and conflict, it is essential to discuss the
shortcomings of the HIV-opportunity cost theory and outline why HIV may not be the public
health concern to consider in the opportunity cost-conflict model. I then present my argument for
non-HIV diseases and conflict.
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CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS AND
HYPOTHESES
Revisiting the HIV-Conflict Model
The HIV-conflict study (Kustra 2017) is the only quantitative investigation into HIV’s
effect on conflict. The paper intended to gain a better understanding of HIV's effect on the
likelihood of civil war and it does present evidence suggesting that life expectancy-conflict
model should be further investigated. However, the HIV-conflict argument relies on assumptions
that overlook many aspects of HIV’s changing outlook, including improved access to treatment
and increases in life expectancy due to advances in ART care. The primary argument for the
HIV-conflict model heavily relies on a quote from a British army officer who makes a specific
comment about Kamajors in Sierra Leone Civil War. ‘‘The incredibly high rate of HIV and
AIDS among [Africans] makes them fearless. They have nothing to live for anyway’’ (Hoffman
2011, 244). There is no empirical evidence to support this claim that very well may be nothing
more than an off cuff remark or a biased interpretation from the perspective of a single officer.
The use of the quote, besides being logically bizarre, rests on what can only be described as a
nakedly racist assumption that most African men are HIV positive. Nonetheless, Kustra (2017)
misuses the quote and generalizes it to Africans everywhere and uses it to as evidence to develop
an HIV-conflict model. This model is problematic for several reasons.
First, this theory relies on assumptions that do nothing to address or consider resilience
among HIV-positive individuals. Broadly, resilience refers to a process in which adversity
confronts an individual, they either overcome, respond to, or adapt to the changes in a way that
allows them to continue leading and living their lives at a normal, or near-normal, capacity (De
Santis et al 2013). Indeed, an HIV-positive diagnosis qualifies as adversity. Despite of an
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adverse diagnosis, people have lives they want to live. They may use their newfound knowledge
of status as a motivator for personal development (Betancourt et al 2011), contrary to theory’s
assertion that they “have nothing to live for anyways” (Hoffman 2010, page 244; qtd Kustra
2017, page 3).
Second, even if HIV-positive individuals had “nothing to live for,” and even if the
assumption that most African men are HIV positive were correct, the theory would still rely on
those men knowing they are, in fact, HIV positive. Between 1990 and 2012, this is a fanciful
assumption. Representative survey data on status awareness is unavailable for the 1990s.
However, a cross-sectional demographic health survey in Kenya (2003) and Malawi (2003-2004)
suggest an estimated 20% of HIV-positive individuals in Kenya and 16% of HIV-positive
individuals in Malawi were aware of their HIV status at the time of data collection (Anand et al.
2009). The WHO, UNAIDS, and UNICEF conducted extensive demographic health surveys in
12 SSA countries regarding knowledge of HIV status (Matovu & Makumbi 2007). The countries
include Botswana, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria,
DRC, Tanzania, and Uganda. Estimates ranged, but between 12-25% of men and 8-24% of
women were aware of their status in 2007 (Matovu & Makumbi 2007).
A 2012-2013 national HIV survey in Kenya study shows the percent change in the
percentage of the population getting tested for HIV (Ng' ang et al 2014). In 2012, over 70% of
Kenyans received HIV tests and some point in their lives, compared to 36.6% in 2007. Screening
of women increased from 40.7% (2007) to 80.4% (2012) nationally, and men's screenings
increased from 24.9% to 62.5%, respectively (Waruiru et al 2014). Commonly cited barriers to
HIV-testing include a perceived low-risk personal infection, negative perceptions of testing
facilities, vast distances between communities and clinics, transportation costs, stigmatization,
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the fear of discrimination, and compromised confidentiality (Anand et al. 2009; Matovu &
Makumbi 2007). Before screening measures became increasingly available, it was not common
for people to be aware of their serostatus. The above estimates were presumably even lower in
the 1990s.
Third, even if a high level of people have HIV, and even if a high proportion of them know
their status, the argument assumes they are well enough to fight. The incubation period for HIV
to develop into AIDS is about ten years (HIV/AIDS 2019). Therefore, it is not unheard of for
people to learn about their positive status only once their health begins to decline from HIVrelated complications or from contracting an opportunistic infection. In the 1990s and early
2000s, it would often have been the case that potential fighters would only learn their status
when they were becoming too ill to fight.
Early detection and screening services have changed the outlook of status awareness over
the past 15 years. With the use of early screening and increased resources in HIV research and
treatment, individuals are beginning to learn about their HIV status before their health declines.
At which point, ARTs become effective long-term care that can extend life expectancies to
normal, pre-outbreak levels (Pandey & Galvani 2019). It is medically possible for individuals to
lead normal, healthy lives with virtually undetectable viral loads with access to the appropriate
long-term treatment and care (Pandey & Galvani 2019). Access to ARTs increased from 2.9
million people in 2006 to 21.8 million in 2017 and has been accompanied by a 51% reduction in
HIV-related mortality and a 17% reduction in new annual incidences (Pandey & Galvani 2019).
When ARTs are taken with regularity, they block the replication of HIV-infected CD4 cells,
decreasing an individual’s overall ”viral load” (Pandey & Galvani 2019). With a decreased viral

22

load, there is less virus in the body to attack healthy immune cells, allowing people to live longer
and relatively normal lives.
Figure 1 depicts the changes in the global number of deaths averted due to increased access
to ARTs from 1990 to 2016 using data from UNAIDS. The y-axis represents the number of
deaths and deaths averted. In 2005, before the uptake in ARTs, the deaths from HIV reached a
high point of around 6 million, whereas the deaths exceeded several million. In 2010, more lives
were being saved with ARTs, but it was not until 2016 when the number of deaths averted (4
million) surpassed the number of deaths (2 million). The improvements in therapy access are
partly attributable to the increased funding by international national and non-governmental
organizations into HIV research and treatment. Funding amounted to a few hundred thousand
dollars globally in 1982. In 2019, funding reached a combined $34.8 billion from domestic,
private, and international efforts in 2019 (The Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic 2019). In SSA, donor
funding for HIV treatment and outreach has surpassed that for water supply, sanitation services,
and agriculture between, and more recently, outpaced funding for education (Dionne 2017).
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Figure 1: Global Changes in HIV-Related Deaths Averted Due to ART Treatment
Data Source: USAIDS

Lastly, the literature on rebel recruitment overwhelmingly suggests that coercion is the
dominant method of acquiring recruits (Gates 2002; Weinstein 2005). This idea is contrary to the
HIV-onset assumption that individuals willingly join a rebellion in light of a positive HIV
diagnosis (Kustra 2017). A 2003 study using closed-ended questionnaires from 1,042
respondents examines the motivations for individuals joining insurgent and counterinsurgent
factions during the Sierra Leone Civil War (Humphreys & Weinstein 2008). When asked "why
did you join?," 87.8% of respondents in the Revolutionary United Front claim they were
recruited by abduction, followed by 9.6% claiming they supported the group's political goals and
2.4% claiming individuals within the group have better living conditions than those outside the
group.
Further, children are forced to engage in violent conflict with regularity and in high
numbers. Estimates from the GBD (2017) suggest that from 1990-2017 in SSA, the deaths, years
of life lived with a disability (YLD), and DALYs for children ages 5-14 were consistently and
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significantly lower than any other age group. Nevertheless, their participation in combat in SSA
is consistently high. Additionally, the HIV-conflict assumes that HIV infections automatically
creates an increase in the supply of more soldiers. However, the increased supply of potential
rebels does not automatically mean there will be violent conflict. Beyond the assumption that
HIV-positive Africans have nothing to live for, there is no clear mechanism through which HIV
incentivizes participation in violent conflict.
The point I want to make is not that the disease-conflict model cannot be a useful security
concept in political science research. Rather, the concept is certainly useful, although in a much
different way than Kustra suggests.

Argument

According to the GBD (2017), the leading causes of early death and disability from diseases in
low-income countries in 1990 were lower respiratory infections, enteric illnesses, and maternal
and neonatal complications. Reports on the leading causes of early death show that in 1990, early
deaths from HIV ranked nineteen, while neonatal disorders ranked first, and respiratory
infections were second. Enteric conditions follow in third place. Comparatively, 2017 shows
some improvement with neonatal disorders ranked second, respiratory infections fourth, and
diarrheal illness ranked fifth. HIV ranked in eighth place (GBD 2017). In 2017 Central SSA,
enteric illnesses account for 6.6% of total deaths, tuberculosis, and lower respiratory infections
accounted for over 16% of total deaths, compared to 4.7% for HIV. Environmental risk factors
for relatively preventable diseases that pose a significant health burden includes a lack of access
to safe water and sanitation services and a lack of access to basic handwashing facilities. The
WHO (Keenan 2019) estimates globally, around 2 billion people do not have safely-managed
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drinking water services, 3 billion lack access to basic handwashing facilities, and just over 4
billion people utilize unsafe sanitation services and infrastructure. A 2019 UN-Water report
suggests that in SSA, 28% of the population has access to single-home sanitation facilities, and
only 24% of the population can access safe drinking water. Improvements in public
infrastructure, more generally in both rural and urban areas, could significantly reduce the
burden from enteric and respiratory infections, among others.
Another problematic disease is malaria, a vector-borne disease caused by the transmission
of a protozoan parasite, primarily through Anopheles mosquitos. Although malaria is not a
current public health issue in Western societies, 40% of the world’s population, primarily in lowincome countries, is at high risk of contracting and transmitting it (Ricci 2012). Malaria is not
exclusive to the impoverished, but the deprivations associated with poverty can significantly
increase the risk and burden of the illness. Malaria can adversely impact housing quality,
nutrition, and inequalities in health care access (Ricci 2012) of which can be partially explained
by weak governance. Families that live at low-income levels can lack the economic choices and
opportunities for employment, which can hinder access to preventative measures such as bed
nets and insecticides.
Kim Dionne (2017) notes the gap in disease burdens and donor funding for HIV/AIDS and
malaria in sub-Saharan Africa. From 1995 to 2013, there were more cases of malaria than HIV.
Nevertheless, donor funding for HIV consistently surpassed funding for malaria. Donor funding
for HIV outpaced funding for water supply services, sanitation services, and agriculture between
2003 and 2011. Funding for HIV even surpassed funding for education between 2007 and 2011
(Dionne 2017). The increased and sustained funding for HIV research and care may be why the
overall disease burden of HIV is improving quicker than alternative conditions. HIV continues to
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receive a large portion of international and domestic public health funding for research and
increasing access to HIV-specific services and treatments. Due to the chronic nature of HIV and
its long incubation period, increased funding can stem from the potential longevity of living with
the illness. When infected with malaria, a dysentery infection, or respiratory illness, a person is
temporarily ill. Once they recover, they can lead healthy lives, free of routine medical services,
and repeated care. The burden of such diseases could be reduced by increasing investments into
infrastructure more generally, such as health care facilities, safe water, and sanitation facilities.
Figure 2 illustrates a comparison of disease DALYs in SSA from 1990-2017. The numbers
along the y-axis represent the percentage of DALYs for each category of illness out of 100%. In
1990, before improved access to ARTs, the DALY rate for HIV was around 3%, compared with
illnesses like enteric infections (12%), respiratory infections (16%), and maternal and neonatal
complications (12%). In 2005, HIV increased to 15% of the total DALYs in SSA, surpassing the
conditions mentioned above. The ramp-up of testing may partly explain the spike during the
early 2000s. Between 2005 and 2017, no other category made as much improvement in
decreasing DALYs than HIV. In 2017, the disability and premature death from HIV was around
8%, comparable to enteric illnesses and significantly lower than respiratory infections and
maternal/neonatal conditions. The increased deaths averted due to ARTs starting in 2005 in
Figure 1 corresponds to the decrease in HIV DALYs following the 2005 peak in Figure 2.

27

Figure 2: Comparison of DALYs in SSA, 1990-2017
Data Source: GBD

Further, Western societies perceive HIV to be among the most pressing issues for
developing nations. Public opinion data from Afrobarometer, a pan-African surveying
organization focusing on public attitudes towards society and governance, suggest an alternative
narrative in regards to African attitudes towards HIV. Except for Botswana, Namibia, and South
Africa - countries with higher prevalence rates on average - the survey suggests that the
overwhelming majority of individuals are more concerned about alternative health issues than for
HIV (Afrobarometer 2004). More recently, Dionne (2018) argues that people living in countries
with high-prevalence rates perceive HIV as a very low priority, even among people affected by
it. Therefore, which issues do people care about in Africa? The Afrobarometer published
alternative cross-national surveys measuring popular public priorities from 2005-2006. The
average HIV prevalence rate among surveyed countries was 9.2%. Nevertheless, public
perceptions of HIV as a priority (7.3%) falls behind unemployment (40.2%), poverty (26.4%),
and food access (23.1%). Unemployment and food security remained a priority, but water,
infrastructure, and health more broadly are also important issues for the greater African public.
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In light of the sustained burdens of relatively preventable diseases compared to HIV,
improved life conditions of people living with HIV, and the lack of HIV as a public priority in
throughout SSA, I do not think that HIV is the public health concern that best fits the disease conflict model. I argue that health conditions , unrelated to HIV, may be a potential driver of
conflict because of their ability to incite violence through a different process.
My theory of disease and the onset of violent conflict derives from the sociological concept
of relative deprivation (RD). A widely accepted definition of relative deprivation is "an actor's
perception of a discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities" (Gurr
1970). Value expectations are the circumstances or materials of life to which people believe they
are justly entitled, and value capabilities are the circumstances or materials people think they are
capable of getting and maintaining (Gurr 1970). According to the RD theory, it is not an absolute
deprivation of goods or conditions that lead people to political violence. Instead, it is the
perceived discrepancy between expectations and reality of a situation (Farooq et al 2017).
Perceived deprivations in education, health care, and employment create an aggressionfrustration mechanism for collective dissatisfaction, which can manifest into political violence,
social movements, or revolutions (Farooq et al 2017). Unlike previous studies on disease and
conflict (Kustra 2017), I do not assert that adverse health conditions can lead to outright civil
war. Instead, I argue that disease burdens may lead to acts of smaller, localized cases of violence
that can be considered as social banditry.
Hobsbawm (1959) first introduced the concept of the social bandit, referring to the
organized political unrest of the aggrieved against oppression. Social banditry ranges from
collective protests to the use of physical violence. However, participants are generally not
perceived to be criminal by society, and the moral code of the respective community constrains
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their course of action (Blok 1974, pg. 494). Social bandits are not revolutionaries or political
reformers. Their agenda "does not go beyond the restoration of the traditional order which leaves
exploitation of the poor and oppression of the weak within certain limits" (Blok, 1972, pg. 494).
If the burden from relatively preventable diseases is high enough for an extended period, a
perceived weakness in state capacity may influence opportunistic social banditry for health
'reform' that manifests as physical violence.
I intersect the RD theory with the concept of social banditry and public health to build a
theory around disease conditions and conflict. Elevated disease burdens and the perceived
deprivation of socio-economic conditions contributing to sustained adverse health conditions can
trigger an aggression-frustration mechanism. If sustained long enough, the aggression-frustration
mechanism may lead to a collective dissatisfaction over time that may manifest as violent
conflict. I argue diseases that are less connected to individual decision-making and are more
connected to the presence of health poor infrastructure more generally may be a motivator for
violent conflict. The perceived disparities of social and physical conditions directly attributable
to the disease burdens are more likely to lower the opportunity costs of participating in acts of
violence, thus increasing the likelihood of conflict.
It is not necessarily sick individuals who become incentivized to participate in banditry.
Instead, it may be healthy individuals witnessing the adverse socio-economic conditions
connected to increased (or sustained) disease burdens. Adverse socio-economic conditions can
include but are not limited to, poverty, a lack of roads, or inadequate or inaccessible health care
facilities and services, access to clean water resources, limited proper handwashing facilities, and
the lack of access to functioning sanitation and sewage systems. Such conditions are basic
physiological and safety-based needs. Without the proper provisions and commitments from
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governments and local authorities to secure these necessities for general populations, the risk of
transmitting and spreading preventable illnesses increases. Increases in disease burdens can be a
signal to those who are disaffected to coordinate together if they view the state as lacking or
having weakened capacity. The goal is not to overthrow the state. Instead, the goal is to improve
the socio-economic conditions responsible for persistent adverse public health outcomes.

Hypotheses

To thoroughly reexamine the HIV-onset theory, I use updated health metric data to bridge the
empirical gap, testing the relationship between HIV and the onset of violent conflict. In light of
the vast improvements in HIV-related care, increased access to screenings and treatment, and
significant decreases in generalized HIV burdens over the past decade, I suspect there is no
relationship between HIV and violent conflict, contradicting claims made by Kustra (2017) that
HIV is a valid driver of violence.

Hypothesis 1: An increase in HIV conditions will have no effect on the likelihood of violent
conflict.

The second hypothesis corresponds to my argument of disease and the onset of violent
conflict. To the degree that life expectancy is vital for the prospects of rebellion, diseases
unrelated to HIV, generally associated with unfavorable socioeconomic conditions, are more
likely to motivate individuals to partake in acts of violence. My second hypothesis is as follows:
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Hypothesis 2: An increase in non-HIV conditions will have a positive effect on the likelihood of
violent conflict.
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH DESIGN
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable (DV), the onset of violent conflict, comes from the UCDP/PRIO
Armed Conflict Dataset, the leading provider of data relating to organized political violence from
1946 to the present. The DV is measured by cases of violence that resulted in a minimum of 25
battle-related deaths in a given year. The variable is binary with values of 0 or 1. A value of 0
represents a year in which a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths was not recorded. A value of 1
represents a year in which at least 25 recorded battle-related deaths occurred. To better isolate
the health conditions leading up to the outbreak of violent conflict, I lag the dependent variable
for one year. Therefore, the dependent variable data points capture either HIV or non-HIV
conditions one year before the onset of conflict. To best capture moments of violent social
banditry, I choose a minimum 25 battle-related death threshold. This is the same DV as used on
the 2017 Kustra HIV-onset study. However, in the 2017 study, Kustra uses 25 battle-deaths in a
given year to test the relationship of HIV conditions on the likelihood of civil war. A smaller
threshold of battle-deaths in a given year is better suited for this study because social banditry
tends to be more isolated events, fewer battle deaths compared to a civil or interstate war.
Among 37 countries in SSA (see Table 1) and 2,656 observations, 89 cases from 1990-2012 met
the criteria to be coded as 1.
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Table 1: Countries Under Analysis
The Gambia
Mali
Senegal
Benin
Niger
Cote d’ Ivoire
Guinea
Burkina Faso
Liberia

Togo
Cameroon
Nigeria
Gabon
CAF
Chad
Dem. Rep. Congo
Uganda
Kenya

Rwanda
Djibouti
Ethiopia
Eritrea
Angola
Mozambique
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Malawi
Sierra Leone

Namibia
Lesotho
Botswana
Swaziland
Madagascar
Burundi
Ghana
South Africa
Tanzania

Explanatory Variables
The independent variables are the years of life lost (YLL) for HIV, non-HIV, and for all
YLL combined. YLL is an alternative measurement for premature mortality, measuring the lost
years of life due to premature death. It is the difference between the age of premature death and
the expected life expectancy of an individual. The YLL value considers the age when death
occurs. Therefore, deaths at a younger age carry more weight deaths that occur at an older age.
This indicator is generally used in health care planning and is particularly useful in comparing
the premature mortality experiences between different populations and demographics. The nonHIV and all YLL variables measure mortality for both communicable and non-communicable
diseases and conditions that are listed below in Table 2. The data comes from the GBD. This
database quantifies health loss on over 350 diseases and risk factors and disaggregates data from
145 countries from 1990 to the present. The data is collected using local and national-level
censuses reports, vital registrations (birth and death records), disease registries, and
representative health surveys.
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Table 2: Categories of the non-HIV YLL variable
Communicable diseases & conditions

Non-Communicable diseases & conditions

Sexually transmitted infections excluding HIV
Respiratory infections & tuberculosis
Enteric infections
Typhoid and paratyphoid
Tropical diseases
Leishmaniasis
Intestinal nematode infections
Meningitis
Acute hepatitis
Maternal and neonatal disorders
Nutritional deficiencies

Neoplasms
Cardiovascular disease
Diabetes and kidney disease
Digestive disorders
Neurological disorders
Sense organ disease
Congenital birth defects
Urinary diseases
Gynecological disorders
Oral disorders
Injuries
Self-harm and interpersonal violence

Control Variables
The concept of violent conflict is multidimensional and is compounded by a range of factors.
Based on existing conflict literature, I incorporate a variety of controls to isolate the effect of
disease burdens on the likelihood of violence. I account for potential economic output effects by
controlling for two different gross domestic product (GDP) indicators from the World Bank:
GDP per capita and GDP growth. The GDP per capita measures the sum of gross value added by
resident producers in the economy and is based in U.S. dollars. GDP growth measures the annual
percentage change in the volume of a country’s economic output. Population discrepancies
between countries could drive variation in the DV. For instance, it could be the case that conflict
is more likely to strike in nations with larger populations. Thus, it is essential to control
population size. It may also be the case that democracies have fewer cases of violent conflict
compared to non-democracies. Therefore I include a proxy control for regime type, the openness
of executive recruitment.
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Variations in religious demographics could impact the onset of violent conflict. For
example, predominantly Muslim countries are overrepresented among countries with high levels
of internal non-state and one-sided violence. They have higher participation rates in inter-state
conflicts (Gleditsch & Rudolfsen 2016). Consequently, I incorporate a religious control variable
that measures the percentage of the population that is Muslim. It continues to be debated whether
or not a country’s ethnic composition impacts the chances of violence. To account for any effect
of ethnic differences in the population, I include a control for ethnic fragmentation. Lastly,
existing conflict literature suggests that societies with youth bulges are more war-prone than
countries without and “youthful populations and the economic and psychological frustrations
that enable political instability” (Gaan 2015). A youth bulge is when the population of young
men ages 15-24 accounts for at least 20% of the total population. One theory is that societies
with larger youthful populations put a strain on the labor markets of a country because there is an
access labor force and a deficit in available jobs. The tensions produced by an oversaturated
labor force and a lack of jobs can lead to grievances that manifest as violence. To control for any
potential effect of the youth bulge, I use marriage age as a proxy control variable.
One control that this study does not account for is state capacity. Several proxy measures
for state capacity from the World Bank were considered: the percentage of roads and the
percentage of primary and secondary education enrollment. However, the individual addition of
each variable dropped the number of cases by, at best, 24%. Descriptive statistics are listed
below in Table 3.
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Data Limitations
Quantitative research using data for SSA is inherently problematic because the region’s statistics
are often missing, incomplete, or under-reported, limiting the number of overall observations.
This is an inescapable problem for empirical research using African data. There are cases of
conflict in SSA that unaccounted for in the PRIO dataset. For example, the years of the Rwandan
civil war from 1991-1994 do not have recorded battle-related deaths. This is only one of many
that are excluded from the dataset. It is not uncommon to have missing data for African
countries, especially for areas that experience higher levels of conflict. Access to more
comprehensive conflict data would be an obvious benefit to this project and future studies into
African affairs. Another common issue is that quantitative papers investigating individual-level
theories of conflict rely primarily on state-level data. This research paper is no exception.
Individual-level analysis data for why individuals participate in violent conflict is mostly
unavailable. Therefore, state-level data are routinely used in conflict research because there is no
publicly available, better alternative. However, empirical evidence from recent studies on
rebellion suggests that using state-level data to make inferences at the individual level may be
appropriate for this type of study. In a study on informal social controls and civil war onset,
Schroeder and Thyne (2012) find that state-level and individual-level data provided starkly
similar results when investigating the individual desire to rebel.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Name

Definition

Min. Max.

Dependent

Violent Conflict The 1st year a conflict resulted
Onset
in 25 battle-related deaths at
minimum
Independent YLL HIV
Years of life lost due to HIV
Independent YLL Non-HIV Years of life lost due to nonHIV illnesses
Independent All YLL
Total YLL across all diseases
Control
GDP per Capita
GDP per capita ($US)
Control
GDP Growth
Percent of GDP Growth
per capita
Control
Population
Country Population
Control
Xropen2
Openness of executive
recruitment
Control
Muslim
Percent of the population
who are Muslim
Control
Ethnic
Level of ethnic heterogeneity
Fragmentation
Control
Marriage age
Average age of men entering
their 1st marriage

Source

0

1

-0.9
8.7

15.8
19.9

GBD
GBD

8.1
3.9
-65

19.9
11.1
102.8

GBD
WB
WB

13.1
0

21
16

WB
Polity IV

0

99.8

Polity IV

0

147 Vanhanen ‘99

19.8

34.5

UCDP/PRIO

WB

Model Specification
To test my hypotheses, I use probit regressions to measure the effect of disease conditions on the
likelihood of violent conflict. I specify a probit model because the dependent variable has a
binary value of either 0 or 1. The econometric model is as follows:
Pr(Y = 1) = Φ(ß0 + ß1*X1 + ß2*X2 + ß3*(X1*X2) + ß'X' + ε)
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Probit regressions model the probability that Y = 1 using the cumulative standard normal
distribution function. The Y corresponds to the dependent variable, the onset of violent conflict.
Phi (Φ) represents the standard normal distribution and its cumulative distribution function. The
purpose of this model is to constrain the distribution between 0 and 1 for looking at the
probability of a certain value in Y given a vector of predictive variables (X1 or X prime). Beta
zero (ß0) represents the constant intercept for Y, and beta one and onward (ß1, ß2, etc.) are the
slope coefficients that estimate the average change in the z-score probability of Y = 1. Beta X
(ß'X') corresponds to the control variables, and ε corresponds to an unknown error term (Bliss
1934). There are two probit models testing the effects of disease burdens on the likelihood of
violent conflict.
Following the probit models, I use predicative margins to predict responses to violent
conflict if every individual in the sample lost the same number of life years from either HIV or a
non-HIV condition. The x-axis corresponds to the YLL from each of the independent variables
and the y-axis corresponds to the likelihood of violent conflict in percentages. The final graph is
a scatter plot showing the DALYs for HIV and non-HIV diseases one year before the onset of
violent conflict.
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CHAPTER FIVE: DATA & ANALYSES
Probit Regressions
Table 4: Effect of Disease Conditions on the Likelihood Violent Conflict: SSA 1990-2012

Model 1
HIV YLL

Model 2

Model 3

-0.0235
(-0.29)
-----0.113
(-1.02)
0.0173*
(2.20)

--0.817*
(2.32)
--0.0145
(0.15)
0.0184*
(2.17)

----0.756*
(2.21)
-0.00282
(-0.03)
0.0181*
(2.17)

Population

0.185
(1.68)

-0.668
(-1.79)

-0.608
(-1.69)

Xropen

0.005
(0.46)

0.0064
(0.57)

0.00627
(0.57)

Ethnic Frac.

-0.00435
(-1.27)

-0.0054
(-1.56)

-0.00525
(-1.50)

Muslim

0.0081*
(2.52)

0.0079*
(2.48)

Marriage Age

-0.026
(-0.46)

0.0292
(0.42)

0.0241
(0.35)

Constant

-2.053
(-1.02)

-3.513
(-1.65)

-3.343
(-1.58)

Non-HIV YLL
All YLL
GDP Per Capita
GDP Growth

0.00830**
(2.66)

N
730
730
730
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Note: Z critical value statistics in parentheses. All regressions include a spatial lag of one year. The symbols *, **,
and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
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Probit Analyses

Two probit models are investigating the effect of disease conditions on the likelihood of
violent conflict are presented in Table 3. Model 1 tests the effect of HIV YLL conditions, Model
2 tests non-HIV YLL conditions, and Model 3 tests the effect of all YLL (both HIV and nonHIV). All three models utilize the same control variables and have 730 observations. The
direction of the z-score is not indicative of the strength of the effect of the independent variable.
Rather, it illustrates the direction of the relationship.
Model 1 produced a z-score of -0.02. This negative z-score suggests a negative
correlation between HIV and conflict, but this result is statistically insignificant. I do not have
the evidence that the z-score is not due to chance, and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Based on this particular model, HIV conditions do not affect the likelihood of violent conflict,
which aligns with my argument. Since the early 2000s, national, international, and nongovernmental institutions have made a concerted effort to prioritize HIV as a public health
concern. As a consequence of the visible public and private effort to understand the effects of the
disease and to improve short and long-term HIV-related health care, its burden has significantly
reduced from 2005 to the present day by multiple indicators: YLL, DALYs, deaths, incidences,
prevalence rates. A continued, successful, long-term public campaign into HIV awareness and
research may be responsible for unprecedented amounts of funding into HIV research and health
care services that lead to dramatic improvements. In SSA, donor funding for HIV treatment and
outreach outpaced funding for the water supply, sanitation services, agriculture, and education
(Dionne 2017). Precisely because of this influx of funding is why the burden of HIV has a
positive outlook compared to other diseases or conditions that do not receive the same,
coordinated international attention.
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The z-score produced in Model 2 is 0.82, with statistical significance at the 10% level. A
positive and significant z-score suggests that non-HIV conditions affect the likelihood of
violence, supporting my second hypothesis. Given the direction and significance of Model 2, I
reject the null hypothesis and accept that non-HOV conditions positively affect the likelihood of
violent conflict. Model 3 tests all YLL, both HIV and non-HIV, on the likelihood of violence. A
statistically significant z-score of 0.75 supports my broader argument that health conditions may
be linked to outbursts of violence. It is not necessarily sick individuals who become incentivized
to participate in violence. Instead, it may be healthy individuals witnessing the adverse socioeconomic conditions connected to increased (or sustained) disease burdens. High disease burdens
can generate grievances strong enough to incite violence. The grievances stem from weakened
governance – the lack of funding for adequate infrastructure and avenues to access for that
infrastructure can increase the opportunity cost for rebellion. If physical and health-related
conditions are only perceived to worsen, the potential payoff from using violence may outweigh
the value of the future where underling conditions for disease transmission do not improve. It
may not necessarily be the diseases themselves that spark political unrest. Instead, it is the socioeconomic conditions and lack general infrastructure that helps satisfy conditions for disease
transmission that are contested.

Predictive Margins

Predictive margins are useful for approximating the amount of change in Y that will be produced
by a one-unit change in X. The x-axis represents the number of YLL, and the y-axis represents
the chance of violent conflict in percentages. Figure 2 tests the predictive margins for HIV
conditions on the likelihood of violent conflict. The likelihood of violence steadily decreases and
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becomes less likely as the HIV burden rises. However, the margins for each value overlap with
one another, signifying that HIV YLL has no statistical significance on the likelihood of violent
conflict. Although the trend is negative, the results are insignificant, and I reject my first
hypothesis. Again, I accept the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between HIV
conditions and the chances of violence.

Figure 2: Predictive Margin Plot of HIV YLL Effect on Violent Conflict
Data source: PRIO Conflict dataset & GBD

Figure 3 measures the predictive margin effect of non-HIV conditions, and the results suggest a
positive relationship. Between 8 and 16 YLL, the effect of non-HIV conditions is insignificant.
From 17 YLL and up, non-HIV conditions' effect becomes statistically significant, offering
further support for my second hypothesis. With a loss of 17 years, there is about a 10 percent
chance of the outbreak of violent conflict. When the burden increases to 18 years lost, the
likelihood of violence is around 15%. A loss of 19 years comes with a 20% chance of violence
occurring. With a loss of 20 years, the likelihood of onset increases to around 27%. Based on this
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evidence, I reject the null hypothesis an again accept the claim that non-HIV conditions have a
positive effect on the likelihood of violence.

Figure 3: Predictive Margin of Non-HIV YLL Effect on Violent Conflict
Data source: PRIO Conflict dataset & GBD

Scatter Plot
Figure 4 is a scatterplot depicting disease conditions one year before the outbreak of violent
conflict. The scatter plot reports two data points for the same event. Each year will have a brown
(non-HIV) and blue (HIV) dot corresponding to YLL one year before a conflict is recorded. If
there is a year where there is not the same number of teal and brown dots, it is probably the case
where the YLL values are similar and overlap with one another. The x-axis represents the year
before a conflict occurs that resulted in 25 battle-related deaths. The y-axis represents the
percentage of either HIV or non-HIV YLL in a single year.

44

The results of the scatterplot are stark. Non-HIV YLL are consistently higher than HIV
conditions across observations. Looking closer at the data, in 1990, one year before the outbreak
of the Sierra Leone Civil War, HIV accounted for .01% of the total YLL while non-HIV YLL
accounted for 77.5% of total YLL. In cases where the range between HIV and non-HIV values is
smaller, there is still a notable difference in the burden levels. For example, in 1997, one year
before the breakout of the Eritrean-Ethiopian war, the HIV YLL for the country was 8.85%, and
non-HIV related YLL accounted for 78.01%. In 1999 leading up to the second Liberian civil
war, HIV accounted for 4.33%, and non-HIV accounted for 76.86% of total YLL. The general
trend of this scatter plot follows this pattern; One year before violent conflict was recorded, HIV
conditions were far less of a public health burden than non-HIV illnesses.

Figure 4: Scatter Plot of DALYs One Year Prior to Cases of Violent Conflict
Data source: PRIO Conflict dataset and the GBD
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CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION
Social scientists and public health experts have long recognized an association between
conflict and disease. However, the research on the topic overwhelmingly investigates disease
trends as a consequence of conflict, rather than a cause. Studies investigating disease as a cause
of conflict are few and far between. This paper aims to help bridge the empirical gap between
conflict and public health research in SSA by testing the effect of more comprehensive and
disaggregated health metrics from the Global Burden of Disease project against conflict onset
data from the Peace Research Institute Oslo. I began with a systematic review of the literature
around conflict and disease as it relates to soldiers and military organization, risk-taking, and
motivations for rebellion, along with rebel recruitment and opportunity cost literature. I then
present a theoretical and empirical critique of the existing HIV onset theory before positing my
disease burden and violent conflict theory. I assert that improvements in access to and effectivity
of ARTs have significantly decreased the burden of living with HIV. Access to early detection
screening services and exposure to long term therapy can reduce viral loads of HIV to
undetectable levels, allowing HIV-positive individuals to lead seemingly healthy lives.
In contrast, non-HIV disease burdens have fluctuated little over time and currently
account for more DALYs, deaths, YLL than from HIV in SSA. Elevated non-HIV burdens,
combined with the perceived deprivation of socio-economic conditions contributing to sustained
adverse public health conditions, can trigger an aggression-frustration mechanism that manifests
as small-scale violent conflict. I argue that diseases less connected to individual decision-making
and more connected to the presence of poor infrastructure are more likely to incentivize the use
of violence among the aggrieved. Using an alternative measure for premature mortality (YLL)
provided by the GBD, I find robust empirical support for my theory of disease and conflict.
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Probit analysis and predictive margins depict statistical significance between non-HIV conditions
and the likelihood of violent conflict. The results also highlight important implications for public
health and security policymakers. The empirical findings suggest that if disease burdens are
associated with increased chances of violence, it is imperative to invest resources and funding
into public infrastructure that can substantially reduce the burden of relatively preventable
diseases.
For example, increasing access to safely managed water and sanitation facilities could
significantly reduce the burden of many enteric and parasitic infections. According to the Center
for Disease Control (2014), an estimated 88% of deaths from diarrheal illnesses are attributable
to a lack of access to safe water and sanitation services, and 90% of the victims are children
under the age of five years. A study on the cost-effectiveness of water and sanitation intervention
(Haller et al 2007) suggests that over ten years piped water supply and improved sewer
connections “would achieve maximum health gains [estimated at] 71 million DALYs.” Such a
project would cost a global investment of 48 to 60 billion U.S. dollars (Haller et al 2007, page
474). However, this is the more expensive intervention option for the SSA region due to
economic restraints. Improvements in the water supply using pit latrines may be more costeffective, and more and other low-cost options may be more appropriate for countries with
smaller budgets. However, with a cut in costs, the health benefits would not be as high as piped
water installments.
This article uncovers a couple of crucial topics for future conflict research. In the
literature review, I briefly discuss how HIV may impact strategic military capacity by weakening
national security through direct HIV transmission, and indirectly through governments
reallocating funds away from military services into health care costs (Tripodi & Patel 2004).
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Research on the topic of HIV and military budget allocations remains theoretical and has yet
been empirically investigated. Future research can employ empirical models to investigate the
question, to what extent do HIV indicators affect military spending and budget allocation? I also
discuss the idea that HIV impacts child soldiering through a process of parental loss. Particularly,
HIV may play a role in creating a streamline of potential recruits by increasing the “lost orphan
generation” (Leyenaar 2005). However, the argument has not been empirically investigated.
Therefore, a new research question could be to what capacity does HIV conditions affect child
recruitment levels among rebel groups?
Future research on the topic of disease as a driver of conflict should continue to extend
beyond the public health issue of HIV. Using disaggregated health metric data for a variety of
alternative life expectancy indicators for specific diseases and testing their effect on conflict
would undoubtedly be a place to start. The disease burden in SSA is not uniform, and countries
vary in their public health issues. Therefore, to better understand the relationship between health
as a driver for conflict, conducting and comparing single-country case studies could be useful. At
the very least, this article suggests that non-HIV disease conditions may have sufficient
implications for the study on the drivers of violent conflict and warrant further investigation into
the topic. I advocate for political scientists to consider the intersection of public health and
conflict as a component of future security studies research.
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APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES
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USAIDS data on deaths averted due to ARTs (Figure 1)
http://www.aidsinfoonline.org/gam/libraries/aspx/home.aspx
Global Burden of Disease (Figure 2; Independent Variables)
http://ghdx.healthdata.org/gbd-results-tool
Kustra Replication Data
http://www.tylerkustra.com/#Publications
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